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Abstract—We propose a new Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol
based on a Sequential Proof-of-Work constructed with a veri-
fiable random function (VRF) and a verifiable delay function
(VDF) that has the following properties: a) all addresses with
positive stake can participate; b) is fair because the coin stake
is proportional to the distribution of rewards; c) is resistant to
several classic blockchain attacks such as Sybil attacks, ”Nothing-
at-stake” attacks and ”Winner-takes-all” attacks. We call it Vixify
Consensus. We introduce a variant of sequential Proof-of-Work
puzzles with applications on Distributed Randomness Beacons.
Index Terms—blockchain, proof-of-work, verifiable delay func-
tion, verifiable random function, proof-of-stake, distributed con-
sensus, distributed randomness beacon
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting abstract properties of Nakamoto
distributed consensus is that this algorithm is very similar to
implementing random clocks (with time inversely proportional
to computing power) for the miners with the first clock to
stop determining the block proposer. If we can implement this
property in a non-parallelizable version we will save a lot
of energy wasted on traditional Proof-of-Work and we might
open the door also to Fair Proof-of-Stake with an unlimited
number of block proposers.
A robust blockchain avoids centralization of stake and
mining power, then we want to design a distributed consensus
that discourages centralized stake or mining pools, hardware
paralelization, energy waste and Sybil-attacks [1], [2]. Also,
classic Proof of Stake attack such as nothing-at-stake attacks
[3]. Then we want the following properties for our Proof-of-
Stake consensus.
The design objectives of this blockchain consensus for Proof
of Stake [4] are:
1) Mining-is-validating: similarly to Proof-of-Work regard-
ing transaction validation. While mining new blocks
nodes are also validating transactions as the same time.
Nodes work as both block proposers and validators.
2) Stake-aligned: Complete alignment of stake distri-
bution with rewards distribution during consensus
(Rewards(Stake) = 0 for Stake = 0).
3) Independent Aggregation: Aggregating or separating
stake into one or multiple accounts does not change the
reward size ( Rewards(S1 + S1) ≈ Rewards(S1) +
Rewards(S2) ). This property can be separated into the
two better known properties following.
• Sybil-tolerant: Not susceptible to Sybil attacks,
miners spawning multiple parallel block proposers
( Rewards(S1 + S1) >= Rewards(S1) +
Rewards(S2) ).
• Pool-neutral: Aggregating stake into pools does not
provide any advantage ( Rewards(S1 + S1) <=
Rewards(S1) +Rewards(S2)).
4) Consensus-scalability: The consensus remains secure
with arbitrary number of nodes.
5) Permissionless: Any node can join or leave the consen-
sus at any time.
6) Fair Mining: For any mining hardware, its mining speed
eventually converges to a single predefined value.
7) Unbiased: No adversary can manipulate who generates
the next block, even equipped with powerful hardware
[5].
8) Unpredictable: The probability that the adversary makes
an accurate guess on the next block proposer is in
proportion to the guessed nodes voting power. The more
economic way to predict the next block winner given
some stake, is to mine it [5].
9) Fair Rewards: Once a miner mines a block, its mining
reward is in proportion to its stake.
One the most important properties is number 3 because
this property implies that the mining computation cannot be
parallelized, i.e. is non-parallelizable.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS
A. Verifiable random functions
Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) are now common,
such as the one for Elliptic Curve secp256k1, a new standard
for VRFs [6], and are defined using a public-key pair sk, pk
having the property that using a private key sk allows to hash
a plain-text s into a an hash h that can be verified using a
public key pk. VRFs are being popularized these days by
the Algorand Blockchain project, although their consensus
use a voting committee selected by VRF pseudo-randomness,
instead of VDF mining.
VRF syntax and properties follows [6].
A VRF is a triple of algorithms VRFkeygen, VRFeval, and
VRFverify:
• VRFKeyGen(r)→ (pk, sk). On a random input, the key
generation algorithm produces a verification key pk and
a secret key sk pair.
• VRFEval(sk, x) → (h, pi). The evaluation algorithm
takes as input the secret key sk, a message x and produces
a pseudorandom output string h and a proof pi.
• VRFVerify(pk, x, h, pi) → {0, 1}. The verification algo-
rithm takes as input the verification key pk, the message
x, the output h and the proof pi. It outputs 1 if and only
if it verifies that pseudo-random output h is the output
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produced by the evaluation algorithm on inputs sk and
x.
VRF functions should satisfy also the properties
VRF-Uniqueness, VRF-Collision-Resistance and VRF-
Pseudorandomness. In a few words, VRF functions are
public-key signing schemes where the signature is unique
and pseudo-random.
Because pseudo-random h outputs can be interpreted as
fixed-size integer we can also generate more narrow range
integer with modulo. Including integer i as an upper bound:
We define VRFEvalInt(sk, x, n)→ yInt as
h, pi ← VRFEval(sk, x) (1)
yInt ← h mod n (2)
B. Verifiable Delay Functions
Verifiable delays functions (VDFs) such as VDFStep(x, t)
are essentials cryptographic hash functions computing t steps
of computation that cannot be paralelized but the computation
can be verified much faster, or very fast [7]. They have been
proposed as solution to energy inefficient parallelizable Proof-
of-Work consensus because of their non-paralelizable proper-
ties but they raised some concerns regading ”winner-takes-all”
scenarios for nodes with very fast specialized hardware, such
as ASIC hardware.
Definition 1 (Verifiable Delay Function): A Verifiable
Delay Function is a tuple of three algorithms
(VDFSetup,VDFEval,VDFVerify)
• VDFSetup(λ, T ) → pp is a randomised algorithm that
takes a security parameter λ and a time bound T , and
outputs public parameters pp
• VDFEval(pp, x)→ (y, pi) takes an input x and outputs y
and a proof pi
• VDFVerify(pp, x, y, pi) → {0, 1} outputs 1 if y is the
correct evaluation, otherwise 0.
that satisfies the following three properties
• -evaluation time: VDFEval(pp, x) runs in time at most
(1 + )T for all x and pp output by VDFSetup(λ, T ).
• Sequentiality: No adversary A using at most poly(λ)
processors can compute VDFEval in time less than T .
• Uniqueness: For any adversary A:
Pr
[
VDFEval(pp, x) = y
VDFVerify(pp, x, y, pi) = 1
pp← VDFSetup(λ, T )
(x, y, pi)← A(λ)
]
≤ negl(λ)
Practical VDFs with current working implementations were
described by Pietrzak and Wesolowski [8], [9], [10]. Also
a pseudo-VDF that does not scales shows and interesting
assymetric between proving and validating the proof is Sloth
[7].
III. CONSENSUS
Although we discuss a non-prefixed number of steps VDF
puzzle in this section (Algorithm 3), the final consensus
proposed is not search for an output bigger than a difficult but
just generated a VDF proof using a pre-determined number
of steps cased on a VRF proof, i.e. a personalized random
seed. Then we are most interested in the case of sequential
Proof-of-Work based on randomized number of steps.
A. Block structure
A special block structure with subblock independant of VDF
outputs and inputs. We seggregate the fields that are dependent
on the Merkle tree root chosen by the miner so that these fields
are not inputs of the linear puzzles that decide who is the block
proposer. This way any miner cannot control Merkle tree root
to generate many parallel copies of linear VDF mining and
increase its chances of being selected as block proposer.
Block(N-1)
Txs. Indep. Sect. (A):
• BlockHashA(N-2)
• MinerAddress(N-1)
• VRFProof(N-1)
Txs. Dep. Sect. (B):
• BlockHashA+B(N-2)
• VDFProof(N-1)
• MerkleRoot(N-1)
• VRFProofMR(N-1)
Block(N)
Payload Indep. Sect. (A):
• BlockHashA(N-1)
• MinerAddress(N)
• VRFProof(N)
Payload Dep. Sect. (B):
• BlockHashA+B(N-1)
• VDFProof(N)
• MerkleRoot(N)
• VRFProofMR(N)
Mine Next
Block
B. System Setting
Let skk, pkk be the pair of secret key and public key of the
k-th miner. Let Sk be the stake fraction of miner k. Let N be
the height of the latest block, and TN be the difficulty when
the latest block is N . Let H ′N−1 be the hash of (N − 1)-th
block’s metadata, i.e., everything except for Merkle root. Let
H(·) be a hash function.
C. Linear Puzzles
We use linear puzzles to simulate Proof-of-Work [2] but
with a VDF.
Algorithm 1: Proof-of-Work puzzle from miner k’s per-
spective [2].
Input:
Output:
t← 0
while True do
hashN,k(t)← H(merkleN,k, HN−1, t)
if hashN,k(t) > TN then
NonceN,k ← t
return NonceN,k
end
t+ = 1
end
From the binary point of view, we are searching for a
VDFStep() output with a number of leading 1s plus other
binary conditions on the rest of the bits. Each block proposer
is mining VDFStep() until they find the first Nonce big enough
to satisfy the conditions including the RandomSlot.
So, current block proposer will be the one with the small
number of steps satisfying their specific nonce restriction
(there is no global condition for nonces):
ProposerN ← {k ∈ Miners : ∀r ∈ Miners : NonceN,k ≤ NonceN,r}
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Algorithm 2: Vixify: sequential Proof-of-Work puzzle
with pre-calculated number of VDF steps (no need for
continuous VDF in this case)
Input:
Output:
inV RFN ← HashAB(N − 1)⊕MerkleRoot(N)
inV DFN,k ← VRFEval(skk, inV RFN )
HashN,k(t)← VDFEval(inV DFN,k , t) for t ≥ 0
Rangek ← b 1Sk c
SlotN,k ← VRFEval(skk, H ′N−1) mod Rangek
NonceN,k ← HashN,k(QNRSlotN,kN )
Algorithm 3: Sequential Proof-of-Work puzzle with con-
tinuous VDF.
Input:
Output:
VDFInputN,k ← VRFEval(skk, HashA(N − 1))
HashN,k(t)← VDFStep(VDFInputN,k, t)
Rangek ← b1/Skc
RandomSlotN,k ← VRFEvalInt(skk, H ′N−1,Rangek)
NonceN,k ← min{ t : HashN,k(t) > QNRRandomSlotN,kN }
Given the rare case there is more than one proposer per
block, we can choose the one with the smaller number for
steps. If there is also a collision on the number of steps
then we can choose randomly based on VDFInputN,k, that
is pseudorandom.
Difficulty is personalized for the stake of the miner and is
discrete. For example, if the current pseudorandom discrete
slot of the exponent is 0, then we have the linear mining for
the first slot as:
mint{ VDFStep(VDFInputN,k, t) > QN }
were QN is a discrete quantum, same for all miners, that is
dynamically adjusted each block based on average block time
considering a large number of previous blocks.
Also BN is also the same for all miners on the current block,
and allows an exponential adjustment that can protect the
consensus from persistent strong hardware or strong optimized
software attacks, miners with a VDF speed substantially faster
than the rest of the miners.
D. Dynamic Difficulty
There is no question that stake fragmentation increases
average block time because having many miners with little
stake allows only more difficult puzzles than a small number
of miners with large stake portions. If average block time get
bigger we assume this is because the stake fragmentation has
increased. Then is enough to reduce the difficulty linearly.
The base quantum of VDF difficulty QN is reduced by a very
fraction αN dynamic as per every block. This tendency can be
reverted if stakes are being consolidated at some point, then
we need increase linearly QN (See Algorithm 4). With these
changes we want an stable average block time around a fixed
number of seconds.
Algorithm 4: Vixify difficulty adjustment for average
block time. Similar to traditional Proof-of-Work.
Input: N block number, QN current block time
difficulty, α fractional change per block, A0
target block time, A current moving windows
average block time for fixed windows size a
Output: QN+1
if A >= A0 then
QN+1 ← QN ∗ (1− α)
else
QN+1 ← QN ∗ (1 + α)
end
Average block time is also influenced by VDF speed, aver-
age number of VDF steps per second. We need to account for
that also using timestamps in blocks. If average VDF steps per
second get smaller we assume that this is because hardware or
software optimizations have made the VDF computation faster.
This tendency can be economically reverted if big stakeholders
sell their stake and stop mining, then is bi-directional. Then
we can use the maximum speed to date as the reference. Then
the algorithmic adjustment for this will be exponential on the
exponential base RN only in the fractional increment βN if
the maximum speed has been surpassed (see Algorithm 5).
Because there is not target for VDF speed then we must
choose a big moving average window b for VDF speed and
a small change fraction β so this difficulty RN moves very
slowly. This allows miners investing in faster VDF hardware or
software profitable for small time span like minutes or hours,
allowing a miner k on block N to jump from one random
slot VRFEvalInt(skk, H ′N−1, b1/Skc) to a smaller one only
for such a small time.
Algorithm 5: Vixify difficulty adjustment for average
VDF steps per second. Affects slots exponentially to
quickly reduce optimization advantage of any miner.
Input: N block number, RN current block VDF speed
difficulty, β fractional change per block, BN
current moving windows average VDF steps per
second for fixed windows size b
Output: BN+1
if BN >= BN−1 then
RN+1 ← RN ∗ (1− β)
else
RN+1 ← RN ∗ (1 + β)
end
Block timestamps can be manipulated by miners but in a
very limited way. If they lie and produce bigger timestamps,
other peers will detect that and will not propagate those blocks,
if the produce smaller timestamps it will increase the difficulty
then making mining harder for everyone including themselves.
Same with VDF speed, because the only slack for miners is
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distorting timestamps (they cannot distort the VDF number
of steps) without risking loosing the opportunity to propose a
winning block.
E. Distributed Randomness Beacons
A Distributed Randomness Beacon (DRB) is a stripped-
down type of blockchain where there is no payload outside
the minimal components of the protocol and there is a focus
on using the hash of the blocks as a reliable source of
randomness, a source of entropy [11]. These pseudo-random
numbers generated can be used by other layers of a complex
protocol to do random-coin tossing for leader or validator set
selection [12].
A simplified version of Algorithm 2 can be applied to
implement a Distributed Randomness Beacon (DRB), see
Algorithm 6. The exponential protection for fair staking is
removed because we assume the minimal case of a DRB
without block rewards. So without staking and rewards there
is not need to protect rewards fairness. The focus is on using
for each miner a different randomized number of steps for the
VDF. For randomization we used the VRF seed generated for
the private key of the miner.
Algorithm 6: Vixify linear puzzle with pre-calculated
number of VDF steps (no need for continuous VDF in
this case)
Input:
Output:
inV DFN,k ← VRFEval(skk, HashAB(N − 1))
HashN,k(t)← VDFEval(inV DFN,k , t) for t ≥ 0
Rangek ← b 1Sk c
SlotN,k ← VRFEval(skk, H ′N−1) mod Rangek
NonceN,k ← HashN,k(QNRSlotN,kN )
IV. VERIFICATION
A. Mining-is-validating
Proof: The Merkle-tree root hash is a cryptography digest
of the transactions payload. This hash is included as part of
the input of the VDF function for each block and for each
miner, see Algorithm 2. This proves that the each valid block
proposed to be accepted must be a block with a valid set of
transactions.
B. Stake-aligned
Proof: This is trivially true because it can be checked that
if the stake of the miner is zero it cannot propose any valid
block. Otherwise we will find a divided-by-zero error when
calculating the miner slot 1/Sk.
C. Independent Aggregation
The most important property for this Proof-of-Stake consen-
sus is Independent Aggregations (i.e. of stake). The proof of
this Property 3 of Proof-of-Stake (Section I) can be sketched
in the following way:
Proof:
1) Prove Property 3 for stakes of the form 1/2k that are
split into two (≥, Sybil-tolerant).
2) Prove Property 3 for stakes of the form 1/2k that are
aggregated (≤, Pool-neutral).
3) Prove Property 3 for all stake because they have the
form Σk∈1/2k
D. Consensus-scalability and Permission-less
Proof: Our distributed consensus is very similar to
Nakamoto consensus so these properties are directly satisfied.
We are not using a Voting Committee as other protocol,
then, there is not limit to the number of miners proposing
blocks as long as they have a positive balance of coins, also
know as stake.
Any fraction of nodes with any given fraction of stake can
leave the consensus at any time and the protocol is robust to
continue operating with a block time that will be bigger for
some time.
E. Fair Mining
This property is proved based on the dynamic exponential
difficulty adjustment based on the current mean VDF speed
(see Algorithm 5).
F. Unbiased and Unpredictable
Proof: Sketch: is very similar to Nakamoto Consensus
but in this case the probability of being the first to propose a
block and win is proportional to the stake of the miner.
G. Fair Rewards
Block proposer sequential difficulty (number of VDF steps)
is based on slots 1/Sk determined by stake Sk. This is
designed to be a very good approximation of stake itself.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Nothing-at-Stake
Miners cannot generate new addresses to do mining on each
block, because each new address requires a number of staked
coins on the address balance, then due to Property 3 of Proof-
of-Stake (Section I) there is not rewards gain in splitting the
stake into several addresses.
B. Winner-takes-all
The exponential difficulty parameter (Algorithm 2) and its
slow but steady adjustment (Section 5) makes software or
hardware optimizations of VDF speed only profitable for a
short time. After this short time of adjustment is very difficult
to jump from the assigned slot to a smaller one.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, this paper addresses using a Sequential Proof-
of-Work Consensus, called Vixify. It is based on a verifiable
delay function (VDF) and verifiable random function (VRF)
to simulate a distributed consensus very similar to Nakamoto
Consensus but energy-efficient, fair with stakes, and resistant
to Sybil attacks and hardware optimizations.
This distributed consensus we proposed has satisfied the ab-
stract property of Nakamoto Consensus of simulating random
clocks running on each miner but without the possibility of
parallelizing the computation, then the timer for each miner
is not inversely proportional to their computing power but
directly proportional to their stake in coins.
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